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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL RUBEY and 
CAROL RUBEY, his wife 
Plaintiffs and Respondents Case No. 
vs. 
~!ORRIS T. WOOD and 
RUBY J. WOOD, his wife 
Defendants and Appellants 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
9833 
Case No. 
10001 
Appeal from Judgment of Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
Hon. Aldon J. Anderson 
STATEMEN'f OF POINTS 
I. That the court erred in not construing the agree-
ments herein strictly against the respondents who pre-
pared the contracts. 
2. That the trial court erred in refusing the appel-
lants' Motion to Dismiss herein on the ground that the 
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payments had not been made nor tendered on the con-
tract as required by the contract nor within the 90-day 
grace period. 
3. The District Court erred in not granting nor 
taking further testimony or evidence with respect to the 
following matters: 
(a) To determine the intention of the parties as 
to performance of the contracts. 
(b) To settle disputed questions of fact. 
(c) To make a finding as to the time eac,h annual 
installment was to be paid. 
(d) To determine the intention of the parties with 
respect to title insurance and surveys. 
4. That the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
evidence and testimony concerning the intention of the 
parties as to the use of the words, "or more," in the said 
contracts and in making a finding and decree as to the 
language as a rna tter of law. 
5. That the District Court erred in refusing to per-
mit a jury trial with respect to further hearings or 
evidence concerning disputed facts and intention of the 
parties, and this error was in violation of the Seventh 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
6. The trial court erred in denying appellants' 
contention that the appellants be allowed interest at 
the legal rate on the contract balances. 
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7. That the District Court erred in dismissing Civil 
Case No. 139263 after it was consolidated and without 
the appellants being given their statutory right to 
amendment. That the court also erred in denying the 
consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 124832, 139046 and 
139263. 
8. That the court erred in directing the clerk of the 
court to make and deliver a Warranty Deed to the 
respondents and as set out in the Decree of November 
28, 1962. 
9. That it was error for the clerk to pay attorney's 
fees and costs of the deposit that had been made to the 
clerk of the court. 
10. It was error for the Court to grant attorneys' 
fees to respondents based on the account of their at-
torneys. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has pre-
viously heard and ruled on the validity of the contracts 
in this matter under Case No. 9447. The briefs submitted 
in that matter and the decision therein are respectfully 
referred to in explanation of the background in this 
matter. 
No additional testimony has been taken before 
the District Court at Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and the rulings and judgments herein appealed from 
were made by the District Court as a matter of law 
and after hearing arguments by counsel. 
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The District Court has entered two different judg-
ments herein, both of which are appealed from by this 
joint appeal. Said judgments directed performance of 
the agreements between the parties pursuant to respon-
dents' theory of the case. First of said judgments was 
entered November 28, 1962, and appellants objection 
thereto was denied December 18, 1962. Appeal is taken 
from both of these rulings. 
While this appeal was pending, it became apparent 
that there was a good possibility of a number of appeals 
as this contract covered a twenty-year period. Parties 
.as a joint effort to save time and limit appeals, agreed 
to the appointment of a referee by the District CoJ.ITt. 
This was done, a report was rendered by the referee 
and the court at a later date entered a Judgment and 
Decree confirming and adopting the referee's report. 
Appeal is taken from the judgment entered and over-
ruling of appellants' objections to said judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The contracts herein involved were entered into 
between appellants and respondents on April 18, 1959 
and May 11, 1959, and copies of said agreements are 
set out in appellants' brief in Case No. 9447 of this 
court. 
Mr. and Mrs. ''T ood haYe had little experience in 
legal transactions and were inexperienced and naive in 
such matters (see R-105-108 original record first 
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appeal) while Paul Rubey has been engaged in the sale 
and handling of real estate in Salt Lake County for 
about 10 years (see R-148-153 original record). 
The original and first judgment rendered by the 
District Court in this matter pertained merely to up-
holding the contract and not vitiating it for fraud as 
claimed. The Supreme Court of Utah sustained this 
judgment (see decree in Case No. 9447 filed July 20, 
1962) and so while the contract was sustained, the 
interpretation and performance of the contracts in ques-
tion had not been decided or ruled upon by the first 
appeal in this matter. This matter is now before the 
Supreme Court of Utah on the interpretation and per-
formance under the contracts between these parties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT 
CONSTRUING THE AGREEMENTS HERE-
IN STRICTLY AGAINST THE RESPON-
DENTS, WHO PREPARED THE CON-
TRACTS. 
The cardinal rule is well expressed in 12 Am. J ur. 
795, Sec. 252, as follows: 
"Doubtful language in contracts should be 
interpreted most strongly against the party who 
uses it. A written agreement should, in case of 
doubt be interpreted against the party who has 
drawn it." 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Application of this doctrine has only recently been 
applied by the Supreme Court of Utah in Vera M. 
Stout vs. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 
decided October 11, 1963 - found at 385 Pac. 2nd 
608 -the Supreme Court said: 
"Any doubts or uncertainties as to the mean-
ing or effect of the policy must be construed so 
as to resolve said doubts or uncertainties against 
the defendant who prepared the contract." 
In the current case, Rubey typed up the one con-
tract and prepared the other in his own handwriting. 
His background and experience are so evidenced in the 
language used. 
Instead of following this rule, the District Court 
ruled in favor of respondents in almost every instance 
as to these contracts. 
2. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN REFUSING THE APPELLANTS' :\lO-
TION TO DISl\IISS ' HEREIN ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE PAYMENTS HAD 
NOT BEEN MADE OR TENDERED ON 
THE CONTRACT AS REQUIRED BY THE 
CONTRACT NOR \YITHIN THE 90-DAY 
GRACE PERIOD. 
Based upon the recognized rule that a contract 
should be construed strictly against the one who pre-
pared it, the 90-day grace period in this agreement 
should be so construed and when payment was not 
made nor tendered in the grace period, the contract was 
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breached, and therefore the District Court should have 
so ruled. Such a ruling, of course, would negate the con-
tract and render it unenforceable so far as the respon-
dents are concerned because of the breach. 
If payments are required to be made In install-
n1ents, then failure to make payment of any installment 
or within any grace period, is a breach of contract. The 
rule is set out in American Jurisprudence, Volume 55, 
at page 1014: " * * * and if payment is to be made in 
installments, default in the payment of any installment 
is a distinct breach and gives the vendor the right to 
declare a forfeiture therefor." 
The case of Reddish vs. Smith is cited above and 
in that decision the court states: "The rule is laid down 
by 2 W arv 'rend pp. 835, 836: "A neglect or refusal 
of either party to perform on his part will, as a rule, 
place him in the power of the other party, where he 
is not only derelict, to a void the contract or note, at 
his pleasure." See Reddish vs. Smith, 10 Wash 178, 
38 Pac. 1003. 
In Sherman vs. Western Construction Co., Inc., 
the court referred to the above case and said: "The gen-
eral rule is stated in 17 C.J.S., 932, as follows: Where 
the covenants or promises in a contract are dependent, 
only one who has performed, or tendered performance 
on his part, can enforce the contract." (See Sherman 
vs. 'V estern Constructon Co., Inc., a Washington case 
cited at 127 Pac. 2nd 673). (Italics ours). 
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3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
NOT GRANTING NOR TAKING FURTHER 
TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE IN THIS 
MATTER AND WITH RESPECT TO THE 
FOLLOWING MATTERS: 
(a) TO DETERMINE THE INTENTION 
OF THE PARTIES AS TO PERFORMANCE 
OF THE CONTRACTS. 
(b) TO SETTLE DISPUTED QUESTIONS 
OF FACT. 
(c) TO MAKE A :FINDING AS TO TilE 
TIME EACH ANNUAL INSTALLMENT 
WAS TO BE PAID. 
(d) TO DETERMINE THE INTENTION 
OF THE PARTIES \VITH RESPECT TO 
TITLE INSURANCE AND SURVEYS. 
With respect to the above points, we respectfully 
refer to the general statement as set out in 55 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 97, as follows: 
"The cardinal principle in the interpretation 
of contracts, including offers, options and con-
tracts for the sale of land, is to ascertain the in-
tention of the parties and give effect thereto if 
it can be collected from the instrument and the 
circumstances without violating some settled 
legal principle. The intent of the parties thus 
expressed is to be carried into effect so far as 
consistent with rules of law. 'Vords are to be 
construed in the manner in which the parties 
understood them; resort is to be had to every 
10 
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clause and word in the instrument for the pur-
pose of ascertaining that understanding and in-
tent. A land contract is to be viewed as a whole 
and in the light of the circumstances surrounding 
its execution, with a view to determining the in-
tention of the parties. \\There it consists of or is 
evidenced by several connected instruments con-
stituting one entire transaction, they must be 
construed together as a whole, and not as sepa-
rate, independent purchases or transactions." 
It is also evident from the following section in 
Am. J ur. (Sec. 98) that parol evidence may be used 
to establish any fact that does not vary, alter or contra-
dict the terms of the instrument or the legal effect of 
the terms used therein. The court may take into con-
sideration conditions and circumstances under which 
the parties contracted and construed the contract in the 
light thereof. See 36 LRA (NS) 313. 
Only by the aid of parol evidence can the court 
ascertain the circumstances under which a contract was 
made, the relation of the parties, and what was their 
mutual knowledge. See 55 ALR·ll53. 
We respectfully submit that there were many 
things discussed and apparently agreed upon between 
these parties and the same was then placed in writing, 
but in the language and terrninology of the respondents' 
choosing. How else can a determination be made of what 
the respective parties considered that language to mean, 
without hearing testimony of each of them as to what 
was discussed and why that provision went into the 
contract. 
11 
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4. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING PARTIES' INTENTION AS 
TO USE OF THE WORDS, "OR MORE," 
IN SAID CONTRACTS AND IN MAI{ING 
A FINDING AND DECREE THEREON AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
We respectfully submit that testimony and evi-
dence should be had to determine intent of parties 
with respect to use of the words, "or more," in the 
contracts. Same legal principles apply as in Point No.3, 
but this one is so important it merits separate con-
sideration. 
We admit that in most cases this language is put 
in to give the buyer the right to pay more if he wants 
to, but in this instance it was put in to explain and 
justify to seller that more would be paid and so ex-
plained to him by Rubey. We respectfully submit that 
the words, "or more" are not limited to benefits and 
rights for Rubey alone. 
5. THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT A 
JURY TRIAL 'VITH RESPECT TO FUR-
THER HEARINGS OR EVIDENCE CON-
CERNING DISPUTED FACTS, AND IN-
TENTION OF THE PARTIES, AND THIS 
ERROR WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE 
SEVENTH Al\IENDl\:IENT OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
12 
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The Constitution of the United States, the Utah 
State Constitution and our Rules of Civil Procedure 
all direct that a jury trial shall be had upon demand 
of any party, unless it is an equity proceeding or some 
other situation where a jury trial is not appropriate. 
Attention is respectfully directed to Holland vs. 
Wilson, a Utah case decided July 8, 1958, found at 
327 Pac. 2d 250. In this case, the court stated as foliows: 
"We are of the opinion that where the question 
is presented as to the right to possession, the 
right to a jury trial is guaranteed. Only by such 
a construction can the section be liberally con-
strued to effect what we believe were the objects 
and intent of the same." 
6. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN DENYING APPELLANTS' CONTEN-
TION THAT THE APPELLANTS BE AL-
LOWED INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE 
ON THE CONTRACT BALANCES. 
The law has long been settled in Utah that inter-
est is allowed on debts overdue, even in absence of 
statute or contract providing therefor. See Wasatch 
Mining Co. vs. Crescent Mining Co., 7 Utah 8, 24 Pacific 
586. Affirmed 151 U.S. 317, 14 S. Ct. 348. 
There is no provision in the contracts between these 
parties for forbearance of interest, and as such under 
custom and law interest should be allowed. Or, if there 
is a question about interest, then evidence should have 
been taken to determine the intention of the parties 
as to interest. 
13 
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7. THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN DIS~1ISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 
139263 AFTER IT WAS CONSOLIDATED 
AND WITHOUT THE APPELLANTS 
BEING GIVEN THEIR STATUTORY 
RIGHT TO AMENDMENT. THAT THE 
COURT ALSO ERRED IN DENYING THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL CASE NOS. 
124832, 139046 and 139263. 
Appellants in this matter, filed a separate action 
identified as Case No. 139263 in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and the same asking 
for a declaratory relief with respect to the agreements 
between these parties. The District Court granted the 
motion for consolidation and then immediately dismissed 
the same, and the same was dismissed without appellants 
being given their statutory right to amendment. It was 
also error for the trial court to assume jurisdiction of a 
motion to dismiss a new case, as this matter should 
have gone before the regular law and motion court for 
disposition. That the District Court also erred in deny-
ing consolidation and hearing of Civil Case Nos. 124832, 
139046 and 139263 as they all arise and flow from the 
contracts between these parties and are all based upon 
the interpretation of the said agreements, and damages 
or rights that flow from the same. 
D 
B. 
(] 
l( 
m 
(( 
au: 
-, 
<J 
8. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DI- :~t 
RECTING THE CLERK OF THE COlTRT l'r 
TO MAKE AND DELIY.ER A ''r ARRANTY 
14 
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DEED TO THE RESPONDENTS AND AS 
SET OUT IN THE DECREE OF NOVEM-
BER 28, 1962. 
9. THAT IT WAS ERROR FOR THE 
CLERK TO PAY ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS OUT OF THE DEPOSIT THAT HAD 
BEEN MADE TO THE CLERK OF THE 
COURT. 
We respectfully submit that the District Court 
did not have the authority nor the right to direct the 
Clerk of the Court to issue a Warranty Deed for the 
appellants as this deprived the appellants of their prop-
erty without due process of law, was an exercise of 
authority not extended to District Court Judges and 
was made in violation of third party rights who had 
proper liens against the property in question. We sub-
mit that the court may have had the authority to issue 
a decree in which it would be adjudged and decreed that 
certain property was then the property of respondents, 
but we respectfully submit that the District Court did 
not have the authority nor the right to have the Clerk 
of the Court sign a Warranty Deed for and on behalf 
of these appellants. 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Judge 
did not have the authority to act as he did and order 
the clerk to issue a warranty deed for the appellants. 
Under the provisions of 78-7-18, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, the court has powers conferred by law, and 
15 
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these powers do not extend to cover the present act of 
the district court in ordering the execution of a deed. 
The general rule requires a judge to exercise his 
judicial authority in person without delegation to an-
other. The jurisdiction and powers of a judge extend 
and are limited to those fixed by law. Beyond that he 
cannot act; nor is he required to do so. See Vol. 48, 
Corpis Juris Secundum, at page 1008. 
10. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
GRANT ATTORNEYS' FEES TO RESPOND-
ENTS BASED ON THE ACCOUNT OF THEIR 
ATTORNEYS. 
The court herein made an award of attorneys' fees 
to respondents based upon counsel's statement of ac-
count. We respectfully urge this was error for the 
following reasons: 
(a) Any award of attorneys' fes was premature 
until this present appeal was settled. 
(b) Attorneys' fees should be awarded upon rea-
sonable basis and not upon an attorney's account ren-
dered to respondent. On respondent's first motion for 
attorneys' fees the same was denied but allowance given 
to amend because counsel had attempted to re-evaluate 
attorneys' fees previously awarded. Then on hearing, 
the entire amount was allowed as petitioned, but this 
covered only attorneys' fees from the last time award 
was made. 
16 
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(c) If we 1nade a strict construction against re-
spondents, then no attorneys' fees should be allowed as 
contract does not mention attorney, but refers to "at-
troney.'' 
CONCLUSION 
V\Te respectfully submit that the two or more judg-
ments and decrees entered by the district court should 
be reversed, and that this matter should be remanded 
with instructions to the lower court to take evidence 
and hear testimony with respect to the disputed points 
of the contracts involved, that the district court be 
ordered to construe the contracts strictly against the 
respondents; that direction be given to hear particularly 
evidence concerning the meaning of the words "or 
n1ore"; that should the matter be remanded for hearing 
that all three actions be consolidated for trial and that 
trial be had by jury. 
D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON and 
WILLIAM J. CA YIAS 
405 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for .Appellants 
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